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IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR 
ARBITRAL AWARDS 
Mary A. Bedikiant 
PRECIS 
The labor arbitration process has long been heralded as the hall-
mark of industrial democracy by providing a method of resolving 
"grievances of the shop" through meaningful and peaceful resolu-
tion. Characterized by scholars as a "uniquely American phenome-
non," the process is firmly embraced by the United States Su-
preme Court as a viable substitute for litigation. 
The primary source of judicial support for the process is the 
Steelworkers' Trilogy, a series of cases decided in 1960 in which 
the Supreme Court consummated a strong national policy favoring 
arbitration of labor-management disputes. Since then, the process 
has become essentially entrenched in American labor law, and is 
considered to be an integral part of the collective bargaining 
process. 
Arbitrators deciding the legitimacy of labor-management dis-
putes are given tremendous latitude in formulating remedies. Uni-
versally viewed as private judges chosen by the parties to decide 
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matters of contract, the role of the courts in reviewing arbitrators' 
decisions is narrowly circumscribed. Arbitrators render awards. 
Only if necessary will courts enforce them. Rarely will courts re-
verse them. 
This finality aspect is one of the most salient features of the la-
.bor arbitration process and is predicated on two factors: a) the par-
ties' desire to accept the arbitrator's decision as written and, b) the 
premise that broad judicial review would undermine and discour-
age the use of the process. Indeed, the level of respect accorded to 
labor arbitration by parties, courts and society is the primary rea-
son it has survived, expanded and continues to be widely utilized. 
However, recent federal appellate court and Supreme Court de-
cisions appear to have diminished the finality aspect of arbitration. 
These decisions address circumstances where public policy consid-
erations may justify the non-enforcement of an arbitrator's award. 
At issue is the meaning and scope of public policy. What are per-
missible public policy grounds for judicial intervention and its im-
pact on the labor arbitration process is the subject of this article. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 695 
I. Setting the Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696 
A. Passage of the United States Arbitration Act -
Legislative Endorsement of the Process. . . . . . . 696 
B. Passage of § 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947 ......................... 697 
C. The Steelworkers' Trilogy - Judicial Recogni-
tion of the Arbitration Process Crystallizes. . . . 699 
D. The Adoption of the Deferral Doctrine . . . . . . . 700 
E. Gardner-Denver Carves Out an Exception for 
Individual Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 703 
II. The Nature of the Academic Debate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706 
A. The Extremist Views of the Controversy: The 
Meltzer-Howlett Dichotomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706 
B. The Moderate View Outgrowth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707 
III. Transformation of the Debate: A Problem for the 
Courts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708 
A. Division or Consistency Among the Circuits . . . 708 
Restrictive Views on Public Policy ............... 709 
HeinOnline -- 1988 Det. C.L. Rev. 695 1988
1988] Riding on the Horns of a Dilemma 695 
1. Second Circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709 
2. Ninth Circuit Responds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 711 
3. D. C. Circuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713 
4. Seventh Circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 714 
Expansive Views on Public Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 716 
5. Fifth Circuit ......................... 716 
B. Misco and its Potential Ramifications .... . . . . 718 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720 
"The arbitrator is still king, the designated contract reader, and finality 
is his sceptre." 
Gerald D. Skoning in arguments 
before the United States Su-
preme Court U.S. Postal Service 
v. Letter Carriers. 
No. 87-59 (February, 1988) 
INTRODUCTION 
Structured labor arbitration, a process by which parties to a col-
lective bargaining agreement designate an impartial third-person 
to decide a labor dispute, was an advent of World War II, even 
though embryonic stages of the process could be discerned prior to 
World War J.1 Its survival between 1918 and 1945 cannot be 
ascribed to judicial support, but rather to the desire on the part of 
employer and union to retain control of the collective bargaining 
relationship, and not delegate fundamental or ancillary obligations 
of the relationship to the courts.2 
The growth of labor arbitration accelerated dramatically after 
1. In early American history, arbitration procedures were provided in contracts where 
disputes of intent and interpretation occurred. The use of arbitration was largely confined 
'to the business sector. 
2. One of the major themes propounded by organized labor supporters was that courts 
were not "institutionally capable of formulating or implementing a workable labor policy." 1 
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 3-4 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter MORRIS). Morris at-
tributes this difficulty to two principal factors: "the process of case-by-case adjudication was 
an inadequate instrument for the formulation of a cohesive policy or rational substantive 
norms of conduct" and court procedures were too rigid and formal. [d. Perhaps more impor-
tant than these two factors was the milieu in which labor found itself during this period of 
development. Courts were quick to indict for criminal conspiracy employees who engaged in 
concerted activity. Keeping labor-management issues outside the aegis of the court system 
was by design deliberate. 
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World War II. Pundits of history attribute .this growth to three 
factors: a) the passage of the United States Arbitration Act of 
1925; b) the impermissibility of the strike weapon to compel com-
pliance with the collective bargaining agreement, and c) the steady 
proliferation of labor organizations in the late 1930's and early 
1940'S.8 
Judicial support for the process remained elusive in the early 
stages of its development. Interestingly, David Feller, in his article, 
"The Impact of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration" suggests 
that whatever judicial support now exists for the labor arbitration 
process was fostered by congressional policies favoring arbitration, 
policies whose origins may be perceived as more obscure than most 
of us have come to believe. The Wagner Act of 1935' omitted any 
reference to arbitration, and the Norris-La Guardia Act of 193211 
spoke only in terms of interest arbitration, a process used to create 
rights, not interpret them. 
I. SETTING THE SCENE 
A. Passage of the United States Arbitration Act - Legislative En-
dorsement of the Process 
The first of the major legislative enactments enhancing the use 
of labor arbitration was the United States Arbitration Act, passed· 
in 1925.6 Though several states had passed their own statutes en-
forcing arbitration agreements to replace the common law modules 
precluding the use of judicial process to compel compliance with 
an arbitration clause, this congressional enactment sought to pro-
vide a uniform procedure for recognizing agreements to arbitrate 
present and future disputes, and to establish parameters for the 
3. Feller, The Impact of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration in America, FUTURE OF 
LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA (1976). 0 
4. Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1970 & Supp. V 
1987)). 
5. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932)(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970 & 
Supp. V 1987)). 
6. United State Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, was first enacted February 12, 1925 
(43 Stat. 883), codified July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 669), and amended September 3, 1954 (68 
Stat. 1233). Chapter 2 was added July 31, 1970 (84 Stat. 692). The Act was passed primarily 
as a response to the union movement within the private sector. Its passage was expedited by 
the increased refusal on the part of employers and labor organizations in industries affecting 
commerce to abide by agreements to arbitrate labor disputes or to honor arbitration awards. 
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scope of judicial review. 
No sooner had this legislation gone into effect did it become 
clear that its reach was not as expansive as initially contemplated. 
Even though some federal courts were relying on the statute to 
specifically enforce arbitration clauses in collective bargaining 
agreements, it was questionable whether the courts were vested 
with such authority. Section 1 of the Act expressly excluded con-
tracts of employment.7 This language fostered confusion as to 
whether collective bargaining agreements constituted such con-
tracts. Progressive courts managed to circumvent this problem by 
theorizing that contracts of employment meant individually nego-
tiated contracts, not collective bargaining agreements.8 The prob-
lem would not become moot until years later. 
B. Passage of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 
1947 
A combination of external forces prompted further legislation. 
What was then viewed as excessive pro-union sentiment coupled 
with the recognition that courts were not "institutionally capable" 
of developing "workable labor policies" culminated in the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA) of 1947.9 Faced with a spate 
of potentially crippling strikes, numerous versions of this labor re-
form bill were prepared by House and Senate committees. The fi-
nal draft produced by the Conference Committee was vetoed by 
President Truman out of concern that "[t]he bill taken as a whole 
would reverse the basic direction of our national labor policy, in-
7. This section specifically provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged 
in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1970 & supp. V 1987). 
8. This issue was addressed in Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local No. 150, 351 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965). The employer asserted that the 
collective bargaining agreement was a contract of employment within the meaning of Sec-
tion 1 of the Act. Ergo, the arbitration provisions were inapplicable. The court held that 
facts concerning the merits of a particular controversy must be found by the arbitrator. The 
exclusion, on the other hand, specifically related to workers engaged in interstate or foreign 
commerce. See International Ass'n. of Mach. and Aerospace Workers v. General Elec. Co., 
406 F.2d 1046, (2d Cir. 1969); Local 19, Warehouse, Processing & Distributive v. Workers 
Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776, 781, (6th Cir. 1956). 
9. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
167 (1970 & Supp. V 1987». See supra note 5. In addition to the cited two factors preclud-
ing the development of a cohesive labor policy was the reluctance of the courts to invade 
legislative turf. Judicial activism was benign. 
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ject the government into private economic affairs on an unprece-
dented scale, and conflict with important principles of our demo-
cratic society."10 Congress overrode the veto, and the bill went into 
effect in August of 1947. 
Section 301(a) of the Act provides, in relevant part: "Suits for 
violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... 
may be brought in any district court of the United States having 
jurisdiction of the parties . . . ." 
The natural tension between the United States Arbitration Act 
and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act became 
evident. The issue of which legislative enactment served as the 
source of law compelling enforcement of labor arbitration agree-
ments was ultimately addressed in the celebrated Textile Workers 
Union of America u. Lincoln Mills case. ll On the issue of substan-
tive law, the Supreme Court held that the LMRA is "federal law 
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor 
laws. "12 The court proceeded to note: 
The Labor Management Relations Act . . . points out what the parties 
mayor may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the 
penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statu-
tory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation 
and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of 
judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. ls 
Thus, Lincoln Mills, through Section 301 permitted the enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate and the concomitant award. Fed-
10. President's Message on Veto of Taft-Hartley Bill (June 20, 1947), 20 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 22 (1947). For a more detailed explanation of the historical evolution of the Taft-
Hartley Bill, See MORRIS, supra note 2. 
11. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
12. Id. at 456. 
13. Id. at 460. Much has been said about the famous Frankfurter dissent in this case. 
According to Frankfurter, the majority's decision to enforce labor arbitration agreements 
was reached primarily by reliance upon § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, not 
the United States Arbitration Act, thus constituting a silent rejection of the inapplicability 
of the Arbitration Act. A better analysis of the decision may be that the Court's use of and 
reliance upon the non-statutory body of federal substantive law, lacking in § 301, was suffi-
cient to reach the desired goal of enforcing the arbitration provision. See Rushfield, Federal 
Discovery in Aid of Labor Arbitration, 459 AR. IV-3 at 2 (1976) (unpublished article in the 
Library of the American Arbitration Association (AAA»; Kramer, In the Wake of Lincoln 
Mills, 9 LAB. L.J. 835 (1958); Smith & Jones, The Impact of the Emerging Federal Law of 
Grievance Arbitration on Judges, Arbitrators, and Parties, 52 VA. L. REV. 831 (1966). 
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eral courts were permitted to borrow from state law in an effort to 
fashion a body of federal law consistent with the national law poli-
cies inherent in Taft-Hartley. 
C. The Steelworkers' Trilogy - Judicial Recognition of the Arbi-
tration Process Crystallizes 
It was not until the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
the Steelworkers' Trilogy in 1960 that judicial support for the pro-
cess was cemented. l " The Court, speaking through Justice Douglas, 
virtually eulogized the process, acknowledging its inherent superi-
ority over litigation: 
Arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of la-
bor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an ordi-
nary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbi-
tration of commercial agreements has no place here. For arbitration of 
labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel 
of the collective bargaining process itself.15 
Three general propositions grew out of the Trilogy cases, pro-
positions which would essentially govern the future of the labor 
arbitration: (1) judicial review is limited to whether a particular 
grievance is susceptible to the arbitration clause; (2) any doubts as 
to whether a grievance falls within the parameters of the arbitra-
tion clause must be resolved in favor of arbitration (commonly re-
ferred to as "the presumption favoring arbitrability"); and (3) an 
arbitrator's award must draw its essence from the collective bar-
gaining agreement. If an arbitrator has not exceeded his/her au-
thority, the courts must enforce the award as written, despite any 
judicial misgivings. 
With this strong arsenal in hand, labor arbitration expanded sig-
nificantly after the Trilogy, and began to percolate into the public 
sector. Its most substantial period of growth occurred between 
1960 and 1975, with hundreds of thousands of cases being ushered 
through the process. lS 
14. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & 
Gulf Navigation Co. 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 
U.S. 593 (1960). 
15. Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
16. The American Arbitration Association, a non-profit organization which provides ar-
bitration services, compiles case statistics for labor cases initiated and closed during this 
period. A breakdown follows: 1944 - 1950, 6,759; 1951 - 1960,22,245; 1961 - 1970, 45,051; 
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The Trilogy shriveled judicial review, imposing on courts the re-
sponsibility of exercising truncated powers. Only if an arbitrator's 
award exceeded contract language would it be overturned. Other-
wise, the award would be given deference. 
Thus, the lines of authority between courts and arbitrators so 
carefully postulated through Justice Douglas in the Trilogy set the 
early stages of the scope of judicial review conflict. One major di-
mension of the conflict is the interface between statutory (exter-
nal) and contract law. The arbitrator's function is limited to a 
reading of the contract and a review of past practice if germane. 
While the final result of the arbitrator may well be an assimilation 
of his own experiences, the arbitrator is still required to apply a 
contractual standard. What occurs, however, when statutory law is 
implicated, or begs application to the contractual dispute? Are ar-
bitrators required to consider this law in their decision-making 
process? Or is this a mandate of the courts, as protectors of our 
public laws? Simply put, should an arbitrator ignore the law and 
remain within the four corners of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, or invoke the law where authority to do so is hazy, and risk 
award vacatur? From the Trilogy emanated a virtual collision 
course between arbitrators, the National Labor Relations Board 
and the courts. 
D. The Adoption of the Deferral Doctrine 
This collision course prompted the National Labor Relations 
Board to look for a way to accommodate the federal policy favoring 
grievance arbitration. It achieved this accommodation, with vary-
ing degrees of consistency, by adopting the deferral doctrine to ad-
judicate employee rights covered by contract and the National La-
bor Relations Act. Through Spielberg Manufacturing CO.,17 
1971 - 1980, 125,548. 
17. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080,36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1152 (1955). The public 
policy anchored in Spielberg was highlighted some years later in International Harvester 
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1155 (1962), wherein the Board cogently ob-
served: "Experience has demonstrated that collective bargaining agreements that provide 
for final and binding arbitration of grievances and disputes arising thereunder, as a 'substi-
tute for industrial strife,' contribute significantly to the attainment of (the Act's) statutory 
objective (of promoting industrial peace and stability)." 
The history concerning the deferral doctrine is far too expansive to cover in this article. 
Since the doctrine does affect the direction of the scope of judicial review conflict, it will be 
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criteria for deferral was established: "Arbitration proceedings must 
be fair and regular, all parties must agree to be bound to the 
award, and the arbitral decision cannot be repugnant to the pur-
poses and policies of the Act." 
This criteria did not authorize the Board to peer into the arbi-
trator's mind - the Board could only determine whether the pro-
cedures used to reach the arbitrator's decision were relatively con-
sistent with its own procedures. The Board's power, like that of 
the courts, was deliberately curtailed. 
A fourth requirement was later imposed. In 1963, in Raytheon 
CO.lS the Board held that deferral would be acknowledged if the 
arbitrator had considered the unfair labor practice charge. 
In the ensuing thirty years, Spielberg was refined, remolded, and 
expanded. In 1974, in Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.,19 the 
Board deferred to an arbitration, despite the failure of the parties 
to present the unfair labor practice issue to the arbitrator. The 
Board concluded that it was enough for the arbitrator to have been 
given an opportunity to review it - the burden to present the is-
sue was on the grievant, and failure to argue the issue would no 
longer preclude deferral. 20 
Several years later, in 1980, the Board overruled Electronic Re-
production Service Corp. In Suburban Motor Freight,2l the Board 
said that the statutory issues had to be addressed by the arbitra-
tor, and the burden of so proving rested on the party demanding 
deferral. 
Suburban Motor Freight was sustained in Propoco, Inc.,22 and 
carried one step further. It was no longer enough for the statutory 
given broad treatment. For a more detailed explanation, refer to MORRIS, supra note 2. See 
also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985); O. FAIRWEATHER, 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1983); Buckley, Implications of 
State Wrongful Discharge Actions on the Grievance Arbitration Remedy, 11 LAWYERS' ARB. 
LETTER 2 (1987); Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The Common Law of the 
Shop v. External Law, 32 ARB. J. 2 (June, 1977); Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observa-
tions on the Scope of Judicial Review. 80 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1980); Scheinholtz & Mis-
cimarra, Issues of External Law in Arbitration hould Arbitrators Consider tatutory Claims 
For Defenses? Dept. of Educ. & Training, Am. Arb. Ass'n. Summer Workshop for Arbitra-
tors & Practitioners (July 20, 1984)(Hershey, Pa.). 
18. 140 N.L.R.B. 833, 52 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1129 (1963). 
19. 213 N.L.R.B. 758 (1974). 
20. Id. at 761. 
21. 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1113 (1980). 
22. 263 N.L.R.B. 136, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1496 (1982). 
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and the contractual issues to be factually parallel and the arbitra-
tor to be presented generally with facts relevant to resolving the 
unfair labor practice issue. Each issue had to be separately 
addressed. 
In 1984, the Board overruled Propoco, adopting the standard 
now used to defer to the arbitration machinery: 
(1) the contractual issue must be factually parallel to the unfair 
labor practice issue, and 
(2) the arbitrator must be presented generally with the facts rel-
evant to resolving the unfair labor practice.23 
To avoid deferral, the grievant has to demonstrate that the arbi-
trator's award is repugnant to the policies of the Board. The arbi-
trator has to be palpably wrong in reaching his decision, i.e., the 
decision is incapable of withstanding an interpretation consistent 
with the Act. 
The accommodation of Board authority came full circle in Col-
lyer Insulated Wire.2' The standard articulated in Collyer author-
ized pre-arbitration deferral of a section 8(a)(5) failure to bargain 
charge, with the caveat that review would again occur, subject to 
Spielberg considerations, if the aggrieved party so requested.21i 
Critical to the board's analysis was the recognition that requiring 
an exhaustion of the collective bargaining agreement not only pro-
vided full effect to the parties' own voluntary agreements but also 
precluded a waste of administrative agency resources by not man-
dating duplication of proceedings in multiple fora. 
Collyer, like Spielberg, underwent several permutations. In 1972, 
in National Radio CO.,26 the Board extended the parameters of the 
deferral policy to include discriminatory and coercive conduct of 
the type cognizable under sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 8(b)(2). Sev-
eral years later, in General American Transportation Corp.,27 the 
Board retreated from the policy articulated in National Radio 
CO.,28 and revived Collyer in its original form. 
It was not until 1984 that the Board had another opportunity to 
23. [d. at 138, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1499. 
24. 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1931 (1971). 
25. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955). 
26. 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1718 (1972). 
27. 228 N.L.R.B. 808, L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1718 (1984). 
28. 198 N.L.R.B. 524, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1718 (1972). 
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revisit the issue of deferral. In United Technologies Corp.29 a case 
involving discipline under section 8(a)(1), the Board reactivated 
the principles enunciated in National Radio, observing that the ar-
bitration process worked well and that the statutory purposes of 
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining is 
ill-served by permitting the parties to ignore their agreement and 
to petition this Board in the first instance for remedial relief. 
E. Gardner-Denver Carves Out an Exception for Individual 
Rights 
While the deferral doctrine was undergoing transformation at 
the Board level, the courts were becoming involved in a similar di-
lemma. In 1974, in the celebrated case of Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver,3o the United States Supreme Court held that an adverse 
decision under a collective bargaining agreement does not preclude 
a grievant from independently pursuing statutory remedies under 
Title VII. 
Arbitrators could continue to construe contractual violations; 
however, identical claims which represented statutory violations 
could only be resolved by the courts. In the opinion of the Court, 
Title VII represented an additional source of rights relating to em-
ployment discrimination, and an individual could not be expected 
to forfeit a private cause of action merely by pursuing his contrac-
tual remedies under the grievance mill of the collective bargaining 
agreement. The Court succinctly characterized the distinction be-
tween contractual and statutory rights as follows: 
As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator's task is to effectuate the 
intent of the parties. His source of authority is the collective bargaining 
agreement, and he must interpret and apply that agreement in accor-
dance with the "industrial common law of the shop" and the various 
needs and desires of the parties.81 
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate 
his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By con-
trast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts indepen-
dent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate na-
ture of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely 
because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. 
29. 268 N.L.R.B. 83, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1049 (1984). 
30. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
31. Id. at 53. 
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And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be 
enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.ss 
Deferral was seemingly emasculated by this seminal decision. 
The Board, in developing its deferral doctrine, was content with 
the policy of coextensive jurisdiction. Even if the National Labor 
Relations Act provided an additional source of rights for employ-
ees, deference would still be given to an arbitrator's decision. De 
novo review would be available under limited circumstances. In 
Gardner-Denver, the Court unequivocally rejected the employer's 
argument in favor of deferral, and held that statutory claims could 
be heard by federal courts de novo. 
In the years following Gardner-Denver, confusion and criticism 
among legal scholars and commentators abounded. By holding that 
election of remedies was not necessarily applicable to cases involv-
ing employment discrimination claims, the Court appeared to re-
treat from the well-established, nearly sacrosanct federal policy 
favoring arbitration of labor disputes.88 
32. [d. at 49-50. 
33. Though Gardner-Denver's application was initially limited to Title VII cases, it was 
ultimately expanded to federal statutory claims generally. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, 450 U.S. 728 (1980), a group of truck drivers sought additional compensa-
tion for pre-trip inspections. When the grievances were rejected in arbitration, the drivers 
then moved for entitlement in federal district court, seeking compensation under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. Also alleged was a breach of the duty of fair representation. Both the 
district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the duty had not been 
breached. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, distinguishing between the union's statutory 
obligation as the exclusive bargaining agent for a group of employees and individual em-
ployee rights provided by a source other than the collective bargaining agreement. The 
Court held that statutory rights vesting in individuals were nonwaivable, and should be 
processed in a forum other than arbitration de novo. Barrentine was expanded several years 
later in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984). McDonald filed a grievance 
subject to the terms of his collective bargaining agreement, contesting his termination. After 
the arbitrator concluded that the grievant's discharge was for just cause, McDonald then 
proceeded in federal court, this time alleging violation of his constitutional rights of free 
speech and free association. The jury returned a verdict in favor of McDonald. The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the theory that res judicata and collateral estoppel 
barred the claim, and the U.S. Supreme Court again reversed. In a painstaking analysis of 
statutory versus contractual claims, the Supreme Court said, in essence, that arbitration as 
conceived and used in the industry can only address contractual claims. "[lIt cannot provide 
an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and con-
stitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard. As a result, according preclusive ef-
fect to an arbitration award in a subsequent § 1983 action would undermine that statute's 
efficacy in protecting federal rights." 466 U.S. at 2911. Despite the expansive extensions of 
Gardner-Denver to non-employment discrimination cases, and the Court's definitive separa-
tion of contractual and statutory rights, the Court did not denude the deferral doctrine 
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The confusion and criticism emanating from Gardner-Denver 
sparked an interesting academic debate, one whose focus has 
sharpened in recent years. At the core of the debate is whether an 
arbitrator, brought into a dispute as a "contract reader" should be 
required to examine the surrounding law to ensure a result com-
patible with the law. And if the arbitrator does not review "exter-
nal" law because it is not within his purview, and the ultimate 
award conflicts with the law, does a reviewing court have the right 
to intercede, and consider the correctness of the arbitrator's 
decision? 
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions have fueled 
this debate. In W.R. Grace v. Rubber Workers Local Union 759,34 
the Supreme Court carved out a specific exception to the general 
doctrine of enforcement of labor arbitration awards. The Court 
held: 
If the contract as interpreted by [the arbitrator) violates some specific 
public policy, we are obliged to refrain from enforcing it. Such a public 
policy, however, must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascer-
tained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general 
considerations of supposed public interests.3o 
The Court's holding was not accompanied by a definition of pub-
lic policy. Federal appellate courts have since grappled with the 
public policy exception, but have failed to articulate any mono-
lithic pronouncement on its scope or meaning. While some courts 
have held that the exception comes into play when an arbitrator 
directs that a party engage in unlawful conduct, others have in-
voked it to avoid an unconscionable result. 
In February of 1987, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, 
Inc.3s At issue was the public policy exception, and the extent to 
which deference to an arbitral award can be justified. The Court's 
deliberations confirmed that at least in labor arbitration, the arbi-
trator may well be king. 
completely. Commentators have focused on footnote 21 of Gardner-Denver where the Court 
states that if fundamental due process is provided to grievants in the arbitral forum, and 
"an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court 
may properly accord it great weight." 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. 
34. 461 U.S. 757 (1983). 
35. [d. at 766 (citations omitted). 
36. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987). 
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It is therefore timely and appropriate to undertake an assess-
ment of the conflict - to what extent, if any, should a labor arbi-
trator resort to external law to decide matters of pure contract, 
and the implications of resorting to the public policy exception 
where arbitrators have reviewed the law, but decided the merits 
differently from that of a reviewing court, or where arbitrators 
have declined to consider the law, and rendered decisions strictly 
by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE ACADEMIC DEBATE 
A. The Extremist Views of the Controversy: The Meltzer-Howlett 
Dichotomy 
In 1975, the year following Gardner-Denver, prominent legal 
scholars and practitioners participated in the Wingspread Confer-
ence, devoted to addressing the legal problems affecting labor arbi-
tration. Of the many diverse views expressed, one was of particular 
significance to labor arbitration - the development of laws affect-
ing the employment relationship would ultimately diminish the 
primacy of the collective bargaining agreement, and "that the 
greatest danger that the system of arbitration faces in the future is 
the accelerating trend to remove more and more elements of the 
employer-employee relationship from the exclusive control of the 
collective bargaining agreement."37 
This forecast prompted two additional inquiries: a) how would 
the labor arbitration process respond when public laws were in-
voked, and b) how would the adjudicative bodies, namely the 
courts, view their role as the guardians of the public law, and treat 
decisions achieved through arbitration.38 
The problem was heatedly debated. Resurrected from the legal 
tombs was the Meltzer-Howlett controversy. In 1967, when the Na-
tional Academy of Arbitrators met at their annual conference, Ber-
nard Meltzer responded to this problem by noting that arbitrators 
are private decision-makers who should not consider the public law 
when rendering decisions, because: 
There is . . . no reason to credit arbitrators with any competence, let 
alone any special expertise, with respect to the law .... A good many 
37. Feller, supra note 3. 
38. Feller, supra note 3. 
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arbitrators lack any legal training at all, and even lawyer-arbitrators do 
not necessarily hold themselves out as knowledgeable about the broad 
range of statutory and administrative materials that may be relevant in 
labor arbitrations. Indeed, my impression - and it is only that - is that 
non-lawyer arbitrators are more willing to rush in where lawyers fear to 
tread .... Arbitrators should ... leave to the courts or other official 
tribunals the determination of whether the agreement contravenes a 
higher law. Otherwise, arbitrators would be deciding issues that go be-
yond not only the submission agreement but also arbitral competence."9 
707 
Some participants suggested that this view was unequivocally 
rooted in the Trilogy - the Court's deference to the arbitral pro-
cess was based not on its perceptions of the arbitrator's ability to 
decide issues of statutory construction, but rather the arbitrator's 
expertise in evaluating the "common law of the shop." A contrast-
ing view, however, was articulated by Robert Howlett, who sug-
gested that arbitrators are obligated to consider relevant public 
laws, particularly if the labor agreement is not compatible with the 
law.40 Howlett supported his position by noting that "[a]rbitrators, 
as well as judges, are subject to and bound by law, whether it is the 
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States or 
a city ordinance. "41 
B. The Moderate View Outgrowth 
Not all legal scholars and practitioners shared these extreme 
views. Over the years, a reconciliation of these hard lines occurred, 
producing a more tempered and judicious moderate position. The 
proponents of this view hold that arbitrators may consider external 
public law in appropriate circumstances. Known as the Mittenthal 
analysis, "an arbitrator's award may not require conduct forbidden 
by law .... " Followers of this school of thought believe this view to 
39. Jones, Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbi-
trators (1967) (Bureau of National Affairs (BNA». 
This is a view consistent with many of the established arbitrators of the time. The late Dean 
Shulman had said: "The arbitrator ... is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by 
superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept. He has no general charter to 
administer justice for a community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a 
system of self-government created by and confined to the parties. He serves their pleasure 
only, to administer the rule of law established by their collective agreement." Shulman, Rea-
son, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999, 1016 (1955). 
40. Jones, supra note 39, at 67. 
41. Jones, supra note 39, at 83. 
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"be more consistent with the special role of arbitrators sanctioned 
by the Trilogy."2 Thus, an arbitrator would not be able to affirma-
tively require a party to engage in unlawful conduct under the 
guise of interpreting a contract clause. 
The academic debate shaped the real issues. Would the courts 
treat arbitral excursions into public law as an infringement on 
their mandate, resurrecting much of the judicial rivalry dominating 
the early history of arbitration? Would courts conclude that a la-
bor arbitrator was not competent to assess and define the parame-
ters of the parties' legal rights and obligations? Or would courts 
hold that only the most egregious arbitral actions or prejudicial 
conduct would permit them to open the door to Pandora's box? 
The next part of the article examines the treatment given by the 
courts to cases involving the public policy exception, and draws 
some preliminary conclusions about the impact on the labor arbi-
tration process. 
III. TRANSFORMATION OF THE DEBATE: A PROBLEM FOR THE 
COURTS 
A. Division or Consistency Among the Circuits 
No adequate discussion of the public policy conundrum can oc-
cur without some prefatory comments about public policy gener-
ally. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines public policy as the 
following: 
That principle of the law which holds that no subject can lawfully do 
that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the 
public good. The term "policy," as applied to a statute, regulation, rule 
of law, course of action, or the like, refers to its probable effect, tendency, 
or object, considered with reference to the social or political well-being of 
the state. Thus, certain classes of acts are said to be "against public pol-
icy," when the law refuses to enforce or recognize them on the ground 
that they have a mischievous tendency, so as to be injurious to the inter-
ests of the state, apart from illegality or immorality!S 
From this definition it is relatively clear that many of the philos-
ophies and thoughts germinating from the Wingspread Conference 
were confined to instances where arbitrators had to weigh contrac-
42. Edwards, Labor Arbitration At The Crossroads: The 'Common Law of the Shop' v. 
External Law. 32 THE ARB. 2, 66 (June, 1977). 
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979). 
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tual structures against statutory claims. As the public policy cases 
unfolded, it became apparent that public policy was more ill-de-
fined than most imagined. Public policy was invoked when positive 
law violations were alleged, and where courts believed there was a 
discernible public policy. 
Restrictive Views on Public Policy 
1. Second Circuit 
One of the earliest and most significant cases decided by this 
circuit was Local 453 v. Otis Elevator.'" Here, an employee was 
terminated following conviction for processing policy slips on em-
ployer's premises during working hours. The arbitrator found that 
the employee had been discharged without just cause, in view of 
his long time service and other mitigating factors. He reinstated 
the employee without back pay. On appeal, the district court re-
versed the arbitrator's award, holding that the arbitrator's award 
was "void and unenforceable" because it was violative of an "over-
riding public policy."411 The court further noted that the award "in-
dulges crime, cripples an employer's power to support the law, and 
impairs his right to prevent exposure to criminalliability."46 
The union moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion was denied by 
another district court judge who basically reaffirmed the first 
judge's holding that the "misconduct involved here is not just an 
infraction of a company rule. It is a misdemeanor under [New 
York Penal Law) .... [T)he responsibility for the observance of 
this law rests upon the owner of the premises and exposes him to 
criminal prosecution. The award should not be complied with."47 
The union appealed from this decision. In a thorough evaluation 
of the facts and law, the Second Circuit concluded: 
- The parties' collective bargaining agreement does not 
define "just cause" for termination; neither does it identify 
criteria governing the propriety of a discharge; 
44. 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1964). 
45. 314 F.2d at 26 (quoting Local 453 v. Otis Elevator Co., 201 F. Supp. 213, 218 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962». 
46. [d. 
47. Local 453 v. Otis Elevator Co., 206 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
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- An arbitrator can supply the definition of just cause 
where the parties have provided the arbitrator with a grant 
of general authority; 
- If the employer wanted the absolute right to discharge 
an employee in the face of a criminal conviction, such lan-
guage could have been incorporated into the parties' 
contract; 
- The "precise nature of the public policy which the 
award was thought to offend is not made clear by either 
opinion in the [d]istrict [c]ourt."48 The district court's anal-
ysis of the public policy issue is considered inadequate; 
- In suits brought under Section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, "the power of the federal courts to 
enforce the terms under the collective bargaining agree-
ments is subject to the restrictions and limitations of the 
public policy of the United States. Thus, when public policy 
is interposed as [an issue], a court must evaluate its as-
serted content;"49 
- And, while there is a public policy which condemns 
gambling by an employee on the premises of the employer, 
the policy may have already been vindicated by the method 
prescribed by the State Legislature, i.e., a criminal convic-
tion and a judicial penalty. Moreover, there may have been 
even greater vindication than the drafters of the penal code 
envisioned because the arbitrator's award permitted a seven 
month layoff without compensation or accrual of seniority 
benefits. llo 
In retrospect, the court in Otis was not unduly concerned about 
protecting the arbitration process. Reaching a decision which did 
not disturb the arbitrator's award was triggered more by the 
court's preoccupation with the meaning and scope of public policy. 
The Second Circuit was not reluctant to carefully scrutinize public 
policy to determine its impact on arbitration proceedings where 
such issues were implicated. Cases undergirded by public policy 
considerations required serious judicial review. 
48. 314 F.2d at 28. 
49. Id. at 29 (citation omitted). 
50. Id. 
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2. Ninth Circuit Responds 
A case of early origin addressing the public policy exception was 
World Airways, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Airline Division."l The court of appeals affirmed the vacating of a 
labor arbitration award which required the retraining of an airline 
pilot whose judgment had deteriorated sufficiently to create a risk 
of harm to the general public."2 The court commented on the stat-
utory duty of air carriers to assume their responsibilities with the 
highest degree of care, as required by the Federal Aviation Act, 
and then noted: "[A]lthough the federal policy of resolving labor 
differences by arbitration is strong, there is also a strong federal 
policy in ensuring the safety of air travel. In weighing these con-
cerns, we cannot overlook the horrible toll in human life that air 
crashes can take. ""3 
The Ninth Circuit confirmed that the public policy exception 
could not be resorted to cavalierly in Amalgamated Transit Union 
v. Aztec Bus Lines/'" An employee was discharged for operating a 
bus that he knew had faulty brakes. In arbitration proceedings to 
determine the status of the employee, the arbitrator found that he 
"exhibited extremely poor judgment.""" Characterizing it as an iso-
lated incident, however, the arbitrator concluded that the circum-
stances did not warrant dismissal. 
The district court upheld the arbitrator's award, and the court of 
appeals affirmed. In affirming, the court stated that there was no 
California statute which made it "illegal to employ bus drivers who 
have previously shown bad judgment. ""6 Thus, the plaintiff, by 
employing the defendant, was not breaking a law. A public policy 
issue does not require substitution of judicial judgment for arbitral 
51. 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978). 
52. [d. at 800-01. 
53. [d. at 803-04. The court of appeals used the pre-emption doctrine to reach its deci-
sion, basically concluding that when two federal laws collide, each must be carefully weighed 
to assess which law has the greatest impact. The arbitrator who does not take this conflict 
into consideration may risk award vacatur. It is efficacious to note, however, that in this 
case, the arbitrator had concluded that the airline acted with cause when it demoted the 
grievant. The arbitrator then read into the award an order to retain and requalify the pilot. 
This result likely strained the language in the collective bargaining agreement, and caused 
the appellate court to conclude that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. 
54. 654 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981). 
55. [d. at 643. 
56. [d. at 644. 
HeinOnline -- 1988 Det. C.L. Rev. 712 1988
712 Detroit College of Law Review [3:693 
judgment. 
One of the most significant cases to be decided by this circuit, 
solidifying further the notion that courts must defer to arbitration 
awards, was Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores. 1I7 The grievant was 
discharged for refusing to deliver spoiled milk, instead notifying 
the local health department. Garibaldi was discharged and grieved, 
but the arbitrator concluded that he had been terminated for 
cause. Garibaldi then filed a claim in California state court, alleg-
ing that his termination was violative of public policy and 
whistle blowing statutes, and entitled him to damages for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 
The employer removed the case to federal court, citing pre-emp-
tion by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 1I8 
Characterizing the action as an appeal of an arbitrator's award, 
thus time-barred, the employer successfully moved to dismiss the 
wrongful termination claim. The tort action was remanded to the 
state court, and Garibaldi appealed. 
The court of appeals, in a cogently prepared opinion, held that 
pre-emption did not apply in instances where California law was 
protective of the very interest at the heart of Garbaldi's claim.1I9 
Not only did California permit actions for wrongful discharge 
where the discharge violates public policy, but in 1985, it passed 
the whistleblowers' statute, precluding retaliation such as dis-
charge where a grievant attempts to curb violations of the law. 
Since the state law protected interests different than those in-
tended by federal labor law, Garibaldi's claims were given recogni-
tion. "The state law may protect interests separate from those pro-
tected by the NLRA provided the interests do not interfere with 
the collective bargaining process. "60 
The notion of limited judicial review and deference to arbitra-
57. 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985). 
58. 726 F.2d at 1368. 
59. [d. at 1371. The court acknowledged that the issue of whether a claim for wrongful 
termination based on a violation of state public policy is pre-empted by federal law was one 
of first impression. Using a traditional analysis, i.e. whether the exercise of state authority 
'frustrate(s) effective implementation of the Act's processes, the court determined that 
where the state has a substantial interest in the regulation of conduct, "and the State's 
interest is one that does not threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory 
scheme," pre-emption would not apply. 
60. [d. at 1375-76. 
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tion was strengthened in Bevles Co. v. Teamsters Local 986.61 Two 
employees were discharged from plaintiff company after failing to 
satisfy the company that they were in the country legally. The ar-
bitrator ruled that the company was in violation of the collective 
bargaining agreement because it would not have been subject to 
criminal liability if it had failed to discharge the employees.62 
On the grounds that there was neither a clearly defined public 
policy violation nor a manifest disregard for the law, the arbitra-
tor's award was affirmed by the district court. Congress has not 
adopted provisions in the INA to make it unlawful for an employer 
to hire an alien who is present and working in the United States 
without appropriate authorization. Absent the intention of Con-
gress for the INA to provide exclusive federal regulation in the em-
ployment of illegal aliens, the undocumented workers are protected 
by the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements. 
3. D.C. Circuit 
An attempt to expand the public policy exception or broaden the 
scope of judicial review was avoided in American Postal Workers 
Union v. United States Postal Service,6s a case combining aspects 
of criminal law with traditional collective bargaining. The grievant 
was terminated after he confessed to stealing postal funds. The 
union grieved the matter to arbitration, and the arbitrator rein-
stated the grievant. The arbitrator's award was predicated on the 
fact that the employer had failed to provide the grievant with a 
Miranda warning. The arbitrator viewed the confession as tainted, 
and set aside the discharge.64 
In a meticulous opinion authored by district court Judge Harry 
Edwards for the three-person court of appeals, it was held that: 
- Where the parties have agreed to submit labor griev-
ances to arbitration, the courts have a very circumscribed 
role to play. 
- The arbitrator's interpretation was supported by a con-
ceivable reading of the collective bargaining agreement. 
61. 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987). 
62. 791 F.2d at 1392. 
63. 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
64. Id. at 3. 
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- The standard of review on which a court can rely is not 
expanded because of an alleged mistake of law. 
- The arbitrator's award must be reinstated because it 
drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 
- Though it is well-understood that courts will not en-
force an arbitrator's award if it violates established law or 
seeks to compel unlawful action, the public policy exception 
is extremely narrow. "[T]he exception is designed to be nar-
row so as to limit potentially intrusive judicial review of ar-
bitration awards under the guise of public policy.66 
An identical construction of the public policy exception occurred 
in Northwest Airlines v. Air-Line Pilots Association.66 In this case, 
the Northwest Airlines System Board of Adjustment had ordered 
reinstatement of a pilot if he could abstain from alcohol for at least 
two years, and who was later recertified by the Federal Aviation 
Administration. The employer appealed, and the federal district 
court sustained the employer's objection, holding that the award 
conflicted with public policy. On appeal, the appellate court re-
versed the decision of the lower court stating "[i]t would be the 
height of judicial chutzpah for us to second-guess the present judg-
ment of the FAA .... At its core, Northwest's argument seeks just 
such a result, which would require this court to impose its 'own 
brand of justice in determining applicable public policy.' "67 
4. Seventh Circuit 
Narrow constructions akin to those of the Second, Ninth and 
D.C. Circuits, were achieved through decisions of the Seventh Cir-
cuit. In International Association of Machinists District No.8 v. 
Campbell Soup CO.,6S the Seventh Circuit held that an arbitrator's 
award, reinstating an employee to a position from which he had 
been discharged for a gambling violation, was enforceable in light 
of the fact that the arbitrator's function and power were expressly 
limited by the collective bargaining agreement and because public 
policy did not require that an employee convicted of such a viola-
65. [d. at"8. 
66. 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1751 (1988). 
67. 808 F.2d at 83. 
68. 406 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820 (1969). 
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tion be discharged. 
Similarly, in E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Em-
ployees Independent Association of East Chicago,69 the court con-
fined its scrutiny to whether "positive law had been violated." In 
this case, an employee was discharged on the basis that he as-
saulted fellow workers and destroyed company property. The 
union grieved, and the matter went to arbitration. The arbitrator 
concluded that the grievant's conduct was triggered by a nervous/ 
mental breakdown, not the use or abuse of drugs, and conse-
quently since he was not at fault for his conduct, just cause for the 
discharge could not be established. Grievant was reinstated to his 
position. 
The district court vacated the arbitrator's decision, concluding 
that the arbitrator failed to weigh the public interest consideration 
of safety in the workplace, instead "enforcing his own notions of 
equity instead of the collective bargaining agreement."70 On re-
view, the court of appeals observed that while the question of 
whether the award violates public policy is ultimately one for reso-
lution by the courts, this public policy must be well-defined and 
dominant to justify a refusal to enforce the award on such 
grounds.71 Here, the arbitrator considered the public policy of 
safety in the workplace, making a factual finding that a recurrence 
of a future breakdown for the grievant was remote. For the court 
to review this matter would require a de novo review, with the 
court re-finding facts already found by the arbitrator. 
The court declined the invitation to review anew the merits be-
cause "even under the less deferential clearly erroneous standard 
of review the arbitrator's factual finding that the likelihood of a 
future breakdown by [the worker] is remote must be accepted."72 
Expansive Views on Public Policy 
5. Fifth Circuit 
A broader public policy exception was carved out in this circuit. 
69. 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 186 (1986). 
70. 790 F.2d at 613. 
71. [d. at 615. 
72. [d. at 617. 
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In General Warehousemen & Helpers v. Standard Brands,73 
plaintiff filed suit to enforce an arbitration agreement which or-
dered that all employees of a Dallas plant be given "superseni-
ority" and receive "compensation and other benefits" upon the 
transfer to defendant's newly constructed plant in Denison.74 Prior 
to the arbitration award, the National Labor Relations Board cer-
tified lAM as the exclusive bargaining agent for the Denison em-
ployees. Teamsters, the union for the Dallas employees, sought to 
protect the contractual rights of the Dallas employees. 
The district court concluded that the arbitrator's award con-
flicted with the NLRB certification and therefore could not be en-
forced. Following a three-pronged test for the enforcement of arbi-
tration awards, the court found that it failed to comply with the 
third criterion, because it is "repugnant" to the NLRA.71i Thus, if 
the award was enforced, the employer would be required to violate 
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement with lAM. "When 
one contract conflicts with the overriding statutory policy of the 
NLRA, it cannot be enforced through specific performance. "76 
Therefore, the appellate court vacated the arbitrator's award, re-
manding the case to the arbitrator to assess damages. 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed its view of public policy in Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America 
AFL-CIO Local 540 v. Great Western Food CO.77 The grievant was 
discharged for "drinking intoxicating liquor while on duty or 
within four hours prior" and "for traveling at a speed greater than 
reasonably prudent."78 The arbitrator ordered reinstatement. The 
employer refused to comply with the award, and the union sought 
enforcement in district court. The lower court upheld the arbitra-
tor's award. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. Though careful to articu-
late its support of limited judicial review, the court went on to 
state that enforcement of an arbitration award should be denied 
only if the dispute is not "arguably arbitrable." "A driver who im-
bibes the spirits endangers not only his own life, but the health 
73. 579 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 588 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1978). 
74. 579 F.2d at 1287. 
75. Id. at 1293. 
76. Id. at 1294. 
77. 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983). 
78. Id. at 123. 
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and safety of all other drivers. "79 The court rationalized that this 
consideration was even more compelling 
when the driver is employed to course the highways in a massive tractor-
trailer rig. The public interest must be protected. The public policy of 
preventing people from drinking and driving is embodied in case law, the 
applicable regulations ... and "pure common sense." This policy is well-
defined and definite, sufficient to preclude enforcement of the arbitra-
tor's decision.80 
This case, along with others from the several circuits, provided 
an opportunity for the United States Supreme Court to resolve 
what was becoming an irreconcilable conflict - what, in fact, was 
the meaning and scope of public policy? The court was presented 
with this opportunity in the seminal case of W.R. Grace & Co. v. 
Rubber Workers, Local 759.81 In reaffirming the narrow standard 
of judicial review, first articulated in the Steelworkers' Trilogy, the 
Court held that public policy "must be well-defined and dominant, 
and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal prece-
dents and not from general considerations of supposed public in-
terest."82 Thus, nebulously defined or esoteric public interests 
could not be used by the courts to substitute their judgment for 
that of arbitrators. External law had to be clear, and arbitrators' 
decisions had to comply with that law. Otherwise, the award could 
be overturned. 
From the above recent cases analyses, it can be seen that gener-
ally, federal appellate courts since W.R. Grace have applied the 
narrow standard of review enunciated by the Supreme Court -
public policy must emanate from clear statutory or case law. By 
and large, courts remain faithful adherents to Trilogy principles, 
refusing to delve into the merits of a case simply because a party 
alleges the intrusion to be proper. 
This result is dictated by the federal public policy favoring arbi-
tration of labor disputes. Courts do not appear to be tempted to 
act contrary to their prescribed role. And despite some rather 
gloomy prognostications in earlier years, labor arbitration does not 
appear to be floundering. One may even legitimately argue that ar-
79. Id. at 125. 
80. Id. 
81. 461 U.S. 757 (1983). 
82. Id. at 766 (citing Muschang v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945). 
HeinOnline -- 1988 Det. C.L. Rev. 718 1988
718 Detroit College of Law Review [3:693 
bitration's favored status is derived from the knowledge that arbi-
tral excesses, awards in direct contravention of public policy em-
bodied in congressional or legislative mandates, is curtailed by the 
very process of judicial review. 
But what types of awards converge with public policy? Reinstat-
ing a grievant who consumes alcohol is not in and of itself legally 
proscribed. But is it simply enough to state that so long as an arbi-
trator's award does not mandate illegal activity (enforcing a senior-
ity plan which discriminates against minorities), it will be upheld? 
Arbitral awards which endanger the public interest may well fall 
within the parameters of the proscription umbrella. The most ob-
vious example is the discharge case of the intoxicated pilot. 
Though the current arbitral thinking is that alcoholism is a disease 
which can be treated, it is not always curable. The public interest 
consideration looms on the horizon. Is the public interest the same 
when we are dealing with a machinist's inhalation of marijuana? 
Probably not. But how substantial must the public interest be to 
justify court review and award vacatur? 
Paperworkers v. MiscO,83 the most recent decision of the United 
States Supreme Court, offered few enlightenments. 
B. Misco and its Potential Ramifications 
In Misco the grievant, an operator of dangerous machinery, was 
discharged from his job because he was found on company prem-
ises in an atmosphere of marijuana smoke in an alleged violation of 
a company rule proscribing operators from working under the in-
fluence of alcohol or other substances.84 The arbitrator rendered a 
33-page opinion in which he noted that though marijuana was in-
deed located in the car in which grievant was apprehended, there 
was no direct evidence indicating that grievant had smoked mari-
juana or had come under its influence.811 As a result of these find-
ings, the arbitrator reinstated the grievant to his former position, 
with full back pay and restoration of supplemental benefits. 
The employer appealed this decision, and was successful in se-
curing reversal of the arbitrator's decision. The district court 
found, in essence, that the arbitrator's award contravened public 
83. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 366. 
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policy and could not be enforced. 
The district court's decision was appealed to the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Characterizing the opinion as whimsical at best, 
the court sustained the district court's decision, holding that the 
evidence the arbitrator was presented with would have been suffi-
cient to sustain a civil verdict and probably a criminal conviction.86 
The court proceeded to elaborate on the hazards of combining ma-
rijuana and dangerous machinery, concluding that an arbitrator's 
award which contravenes the public policy of keeping the work 
place free from such dangers cannot be upheld. 
Critical to the Fifth Circuit's analysis was that marijuana glean-
ings were found in the grievant's automobile after the discharge 
occurred. The arbitrator had refused to consider this evidence 
since it was not known to the employer at the time grievant was 
discharged. Nevertheless, the court weighed the public policy of 
enforcing an arbitrator's award with the public policy of protecting 
the safety of employees in the work place, and concluded that the 
grievant's "abstract procedural rights" were secondary to the pub-
lic interest consideration.87 
In a strongly worded opinion, a unanimous United States Su-
preme Court held that the lower appellate court had erred in va-
cating the arbitrator's award. The decision evidences the Court's 
support of arbitral finality, fundamental to the viability of the pro-
cess, and reaffirms two principles of arbitral jurisprudence: (a) that 
absent fraud or dishonesty, a court cannot reconsider the merits of 
an award "since this would undermine the federal policy of pri-
vately settling labor disputes by arbitration without governmental 
intervention," and, (b) refusal to enforce an award on public policy 
grounds is justified only when the award itself violates a statute, 
regulation, or other manifestation of positive law, or compels con-
duct by the employer that would violate such a law.88 The nexus 
between marijuana gleanings in another employee's car and the 
grievant's use of drugs "is tenuous at best."89 Improvident factfind-
ing, if such were the case, is not a sufficient basis to disturb the 
arbitrator's award. The bright-line test, set out above, confirmed 
86. [d. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 367. 
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that the public policy exception was to be narrowly construed. 
CONCLUSION 
When Gardner-Denver was decided nearly fifteen years ago, pro-
ponents of the labor arbitration process believed it marked the be-
ginning of a deplorable phenomenon - the gradual deterioration 
of the finality aspect of arbitration. The danger most feared was 
that the viability of the process would be threatened as courts 
would begin to interject their own judgment on what constituted 
industrial justice . .since arbitration was not designed to examine 
the efficacy of the industrial marketplace by assessing its ability to 
interface with political, social and economic institutions, it was 
thought courts would fill the void. Some even feared that the court 
had initiated the first of many sophistic misadventures, one which 
would dominate the collective relationship and shape its future. 
These prognoses have not come to bear. Instead, the courts have 
remained essentially supportive of the arbitration process, with 
deference afforded in the majority of cases. Despite the philoso-
phies underpinning the arbitral decision-making process, few arbi-
trators have authored opinions in blatant disregard of statutory is-
sues or external law. Drawing their authority from the labor 
agreement, arbitrators have been conscious of their responsibilities 
primarily as contract readers and not reconcilers of public laws. 
But the two are not necessarily incompatible. When they become 
so, however, courts should be free to intervene. As suggested ear-
lier, it may be the availability of judicial review in limited circum-
stances that keeps the process viable. 
Arbitration of labor disputes has been lauded as a pragmatic in-
stitution. Its growth in the public and private sectors strongly inti-
mates that its survival is not jeopardized by the mere existence of 
judicial review. Limited judicial intervention triggered by the pub-
lic policy exception will not only serve to retain the relatively pris-
tine nature of the process but bolster the values which give the 
collective bargaining relationship in either sector meaning and vi-
tality. In the final analysis, such judicial excursions will not strip 
the arbitration process of its primary and fundamental aspect, fi-
nality, but enhance its utilization. 
